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Abstract
This article analyzes how long head coaches survive in the clubs of 
the first German football league (“Bundesliga”), where the dismissal 
of a presumably weak coach is a generally adopted procedure in case 
of a poor sporting performance of the team. We use duration models 
for repeated events to accommodate the correlation within individuals.
We find that the head coaches of successful teams and those working 
during the more recent “Bosman Effect” period are more likely to 
survive in the Bundesliga. Moreover, the head coaches of clubs with 
relatively high team wage bills are likely to survive for shorter periods 
of time.
Keywords: Duration Models, Head Coach Dismissal, Soccer, 
Bundesliga, Germany
JEL-Code: L83, M12, M51
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1. Introduction
The empirical study of head coach career duration in professional football can benefit 
from the application of event history analysis, a technique that focuses on the effects of 
factors that determine the length of time until the occurrence of some event, such as the 
death of a patient or the dismissal of an employee Yamaguchi (1991), Allison (1984), 
Cleves, Gould and Gutierrez (2002), Cox and Oakes (1984).  This technique has been 
previously used in sports by Okhusa (1999, 2001) and Frick, Pietzner and Prinz (2006) 
and is currently being adopted elsewhere in fields such as labour economics (Carrasco 
1999; Tribó, 2005; Cueto and Mato, 2006; Collier, 2005; Haurin and Sridhar, 2003; 
Gonzalo, 2002), in international relations (Box Steffensmeier, Reiter and Zorn 2003; 
Barros, Passos and Alana, 2005), corporate finance (Holtz-Eakin et al. 1994, Orbe, 
Ferreira and Núñez Antón, 2002; Leung, Rigby and Young, 2003) and industry 
(Requena-Silvente and Walker, 2005).
In this paper we analyze the determinants of head coach career length using a hitherto 
unavailable data set from the “Bundesliga”, the first division in German football. 
The motivation for this research is the following: First, coach dismissals have always 
been and still are used occasionally when (professional) teams perform poorly on the 
pitch. However, dismissing the old and hiring a new head coach not necessarily leads to 
positive results. It is, therefore, important to ascertain the covariates which explain the 
decision to dismiss a coach. Second, a dismissal is a decision in time which in an 
individual coach’s career happens once in a while - possibly depending on the duration 
of his career in the league. This time event characteristic of career length and dismissal 
allow their analysis using an event history model. Finally, it is important for policy 
purposes to investigate the covariates of head coach dismissals. If one knew the 
characteristics leading to these events, then one could better allocate resources used in 
countering such events.
The paper contributes to the theme’s literature in three ways. First, by adopting a panel 
data framework, it uses a hazard model, previously applied by Okhusa (1999, 2001). A 
Repeated events duration model is adopted. Second, it specifically analyzes head coach 
dismissals, an issue that so far has not inspired much research in Europe, despite its 
increasing importance, allowing for salary information. Finally, it analyzes data from 
one of the major European football leagues which, in turn, allow some broader 
generalizations.
This paper is organised as follows. In section 2 we summarize the literature that is of 
relevance in our context. Section 3 describes the contextual setting, i.e. the labour 
market for head coaches in German soccer. In section 4 we present the theoretical 
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framework that underlies the empirical analysis, in section 5 the data and in section 6. 
the results. Section 7 discusses the limitations and some possible extensions of our 
research and, finally, section 8 concludes.
2. Literature Survey
The number of papers adopting event history analysis in (professional) sports has been 
increasing considerably over the past few years as more and more data has been made 
available. Spurr and Barber (1994) analyze the promotion, demotion and turnover of 
pitchers in minor league Baseball in the US in the years 1975-1988 using the Weibull 
model, the Gomperz model and the quadratic model, identifying the variables that were 
more important in predicting promotion, demotion and turnover. Hoang and Rascher 
(1999) study exit discrimination in the NBA during the 1980s concluding that white 
players had a lower risk of being cut than black players. Atkinson and Tschirhart (1986) 
identify individual player determinants of career duration in the NFL (1971-1980) with 
Cox, Weibull, Exponential and Burr-type model, using data on injuries, individual and 
team performance, education, and player position. Ohkusa (1999, 2001) analyzes the 
quit decision among baseball players in Japan with Cox’s proportional hazard model. 
Del Corral, Barros and Prieto-Rodriguez (2007) analyse the pattern of player 
substitutions during a soccer match, using data from the Spanish First Division football 
League in the 2004-2005 season.
More in line with the present research, a number of studies look at the impact of firing 
the head coach on team performance in various European soccer leagues: Tena and 
Forrest (2006) examine the consequences of within-season dismissals of head coaches 
in the “Primera Division”, the top division of Spanish football, in the seasons 2002/03-
2004/05 with an order probit model. Koning (2003) uses data from the first Dutch 
division, covering the period 1993/94-1997/98 with a Poisson model. The study 
conducted by Bruinshoofd and ter Wel (2003) also uses data from the first Dutch 
division, but covers an even longer period of time (12 seasons, 1988/89-1999/00) using 
differences –in-differences estimator. Poulsen (2000) uses data from the first two 
divisions in England, covering the seasons 1993/94-1997/98. Audas, Dobson and 
Goddard (1997, 2002) cover 21 and 28 consecutive seasons (1972/73-1992/93 and 
1972/73-1999/00 respectively) and look at all four division of British professional 
football with an ordered tobit model. Breuer and Singer (1996) use data from 32 
consecutive seasons from the German first division (1963/64-1994/95); the study by 
Salomo and Teichmann (2000) also uses data from the Bundesliga, but covers a slightly 
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different time period (1978/79-1997/98). Finally, Braendle (2005) uses data from ten 
consecutive seasons from the first division in Austria (1994/95-2003/04).
Using data from two of the four Major Leagues in the US (Baseball, 1901-1989 and 
Basketball, 1949/50-1989/90, Scully (1992a, 1992b, 1994) finds that firing the manager 
is rational in the sense that clubs improve their rank order finish the season after the 
head coach had been fired. Borland and Lye (1996) analyze coach separations in 
Australian rules football over a period of more than sixty years (1931-1994). 
Mixon and Trevino (2004) and Kahn (2004) study the impact of race on the career 
duration of head coaches in college football and in the NBA, respectively. 
The influence of either managerial quality or managerial efficiency on team 
performance is studied by Porter and Scully (1982) using data from MLB (1961-1980), 
Kahn (1993) also using major league baseball data (1969-1987), Fizel and D’Itri (1997) 
using data from 147 US-college basketball teams over the period 1984-1991, Horowitz 
(1994) again using MLB data for the period 1903-1992. Jacobs and Singell (1993) as 
well as Singell (1993) analyze data from Major League Baseball (1945-1965). Idson 
and Kahane (2000, 2004) analyse the salary determination in USA national Hockey 
League. Finally, Frick and Simmons (2005) study data from the German Bundesliga 
(for a description of the data set see below) and McCormick and Clement (1992) rely on 
data from the NBA (1980/81-1986/87).
Focusing on survival models, it is verified that they are common in several fields of 
research, but coach survival is a rare issue, Audas, Dobson and Goddard (1999), Audas, 
Goddard and Rowe (2006). Moreover, while these paper adopt matching results and 
coach age, they o not include coach salary and team salary, which may be an important 
predictor of survival.
3. The Labour Market for Head Coaches in German Football
In all but one of the 22 seasons for which we have been able to compile the data used in 
this paper (see below) 18 teams were playing in the German first division 
(“Bundesliga”). At the end of each season the three weakest teams are relegated and 
replaced by the three best-performing teams from the second division1. 
In the history of the Bundesliga more than 300 head coach dismissals have been 
recorded. The annual number of dismissals varies between 4 and 14. While some 
1 In 1991/92, when the two best teams from the first division of the former German Democratic 
Republic (“Oberliga”) were admitted to the Bundesliga, the number of teams was temporarily 
increased to 20. After that season, four teams were relegated to division 2 while only two were 
promoted to division 1, resulting in the well-known size of the league again.
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coaches have been working for one team only, others have been employed by as many 
as seven different clubs2. 
Figure 1
Number of Head Coaches Dismissed per Season (1963/64-2005/06)
1963/64 1973/74 1983/84 1993/94 2003/04
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
Source: Kicker, special issue „40 years of Bundesliga“, p. 198-200; Kicker Finale 05/06
Our analysis, however, concentrates on the period 1981/82-2002/03 since we have 
information on head coach salaries for these 22 consecutive seasons only. Coaching in 
the Bundesliga is similar to other European football leagues, but the relative importance 
of this league at European level make it a representative case study. Dismissal is the 
termination of a contract of employment. It can be by mutual agreement or with 
litigation. As coaches are one of the main important managers in football the analysis of 
their dismissal in a sport league is an important issue for sport labour market policy.
2 Otto Rehhagel, currently head coach of the Greek national team, was formerly employed by Kickers 
Offenbach, Werder Bremen, Borussia Dortmund, Arminia Bielefeld, Fortuna Duesseldorf, Bayern 
Muenchen and 1. FC Kaiserslautern. Moreover, a number of head coaches had up to six different 
employers in the first division (Guyla Lorant, Joerg Berger, Rudi Gutendorf, Kuno Kloetzer, Manfred 
Krafft and Branco Zebec). Some of these coaches have not only been working in the first, but also in 
the second division. Moreover, some coaches have been working for a team not only once, but have 
been hired again after a while.
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4. Theoretical Framework
The focus of this paper is on football coaches in the German Bundesliga in the years 
1981/82- 2002/2003. The length of a football coach’s career depends on three critical 
factors: The individual’s football specific skills and the characteristics of the local 
labour market (preferences for a certain type of football are likely to differ between the 
clubs in a league) are certainly important. What is of prime importance, however, is the 
head coach’s performance, i.e. his win percentage in a particular job. 
The hypotheses to be tested in the empirical part of our paper are as follows:
H1: The relative salary of a head coach determines his career length. Coaches with
relatively high salaries are more likely to remain in their position even in case of 
poor performance, because the opportunity costs of replacing them are quite high. 
This hypothesis will be tested with the variable Rsal-relative salary of head coach
Previous research has already tested this assumption (see Dawson, Dobson and Gerrard 
2000, Porter and Scully 1982). We are, however, the first to use detailed salary 
information over a long period of time for the Bundesliga.
H 2: The career length of the coaches is also determined by the relative wage bills of 
their teams. We assume that coaches working with expensive teams, i.e. those 
with relatively high wage bills, are more likely to be fired when performance lags 
behind expectations. This hypothesis will be tested with the variable RWB-
relative wage bill of the team.
It is one of the few “stylized facts” in the sports economics literature that expensive 
teams are performing better than clubs with moderate or even low wage bills (see Szy-
manski 2003, Forrest and Simmons 2004).
H3: There is a positive trend for the career durations of head coaches, i.e. the 
probability of being dismissed has decreased over time. This hypothesis will be 
tested with the Bosman effect variable.
Although competitive pressures have increased for the players following the “Bosman 
verdict” of the European Court of Justice (see Frick, Pietzner and Prinz 2006), the 
globalisation of the European football industry has not yet affected head coaches in 
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Germany. The number of foreign coaches is low and dismissed coaches can expect to be 
re-hired soon by another team.
H4: Career duration of head coaches in football is positively affected by their win 
percentage, i.e. their career length increases with the number of relative points 
won by their teams. This hypothesis will be tested with the variable CWP –win 
percentage of the head coach and RP-relative point won.
Coaches are constantly monitored not only by the management of their clubs but also 
my millions of football fans. Since the coaches are responsible for the teams’ 
performance on the pitch, more successful coaches are likely to survive longer.
H5: Coaching experience increases the probability of surviving in the current job. The 
longer a coach has been working in professional football, the more human capital 
he has accumulated which, in turn, reduces the probability of getting fired. This 
hypothesis will be tested with the variable CEXP-experience of head coach in the 
Bundesliga.
In one of his seminal publications Mincer (1974) analyzed the relationship between 
experience and earnings showing that career length is a good predictor of current 
income (this relationship, however, is not a linear one).
5. Research Design
In the study of the career durations of head coaches in German professional football the 
event we want to explain is the dismissal, i.e. the premature end to an employment 
relationship. A dismissal can either mean that the coach has to end his career or that he 
is later on re-employed by another team. Many of the coaches whose careers we study 
have held a number of different jobs in the Bundesliga. Since such repeated events are 
unlikely to be independent the Cox proportional hazard model for single event data is 
inadequate for estimation, Kalbfleisch and Prentice (2002). Ignoring this dependence 
might lead to erroneous variance estimates and possibly biased estimates. One possible 
solution to this problem is considering only the time until the first occurrence of an 
event. This specification, however, makes the strong assumption that the time to the 
first event is similar to the time to all events. Moreover this specification implies 
throwing away some data. 
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8
Some semi-parametric proportional hazard-type models have been proposed in the 
literature to be used in case of repeated events, such as the independent increments 
model of Anderson and Gill (1982), the conditional risk-set model in either elapsed or 
gap time of Prentice, Williams and Peterson (1981), and the marginal risk-set model of 
Wei, Lin and Weissfeld (1989). All these models are variance-correction models for 
repeated events and differ in the way they define the risk set and the event time, e.g., 
Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn (2002).
In this paper we use the conditional risk-set model in gap time developed by Prentice, 
Williams and Peterson (1981). In this model, an individual is not at risk for a later event 
until all prior events have occurred and event time is defined as time elapsed since the 
previous event. To estimate this model we cluster on coach identification and stratify by 
event number. The hazard is then specified as
)exp()()|( 10 ikkkikik XtthXth =
where k denotes event number, (.)0kh  is the baseline hazard and varies by event 
number, X is a vector of covariates which can be time dependent and  is a vector of 
parameters. 
The parameters are estimated using the partial likelihood which is given by
( )
( )

= =
= =




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
where  is a censoring indicator equal to one if observed and zero if censored and Y is a 
risk indicator which is equal to one if the individual is at risk for the current event and
zero otherwise. 
We also consider two parametric specifications: the exponential and the Weibull model. 
In the exponential model the baseline hazard is stratified by event number and is 
constant at each event k, with hazard rate,
)exp()()|( 1 ikkkkikik XttIXth  =
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where )( 1 kk ttI  is an indicator function for durations in event k and k the estimated 
baseline at event number k.
In the Weibull model the baseline is defined by
1
110 )()(  = kkkkk tttth 
where the time dependent parameter, k , is estimated separately for each event. Both 
models are estimated through maximum likelihood.
6. Data and Findings
The data used to study the determinants of head coach career duration cover the seasons 
1981/82-2002/2003. The data come from a Sunday newspaper (Die Welt) that publishes 
team wage bills and head coach salaries immediately before the start of a season. 
Supplementary data on team playing records were obtained from Kicker soccer 
magazine. These data give us an unbalanced panel of 398 team-season observations 
featuring 39 teams. Six of these (Bayern Muenchen, Werder Bremen, Borussia 
Dortmund, Hamburger Sportverein, Bayer Leverkusen and VfB Stuttgart) have 
appeared in Bundesliga 1 over the entire sample period; five clubs (Blau-Weiss Berlin, 
Darmstadt 98, VfB Leipzig, Kickers Offenbach and SSV Ulm) were relegated after just 
one season. During the period under consideration we observe different 114 coaches. To 
ensure the validity and reliability of the data, several steps were taken. First, the source 
data is a reliable German newspaper recognised by its rigour and objectivity. Second, 
the data was examined by professionals working in the field, namely labour union 
members, in order to ascertain the reliability of the values. Third, based in this 
investigation we can discard any falsity or contradictions in the data set concluding that 
it is consistent. Fourth, the reliability of the data was examined, analyzing it extensively 
with alternative methods and reaching the same conclusions, Frick, Barros and Prinz 
(2007). Table 1 presents the characteristics of the data used in the analysis.
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Table 1:Characteristics of the Variables
Variable Description Min. Max. Mean Std. Dev.
OUT Binary variable equal to one if coach is 
dismissed; zero otherwise
dependent 
variable
0 1 0.450 0.498
RSAL Relative salary of the head coach 
(individual salary divided by average salary 
of all head coaches in respective season)
Variable testing 
hypothesis 1 0.226 3.079 1.000 0.507
RWB Relative wage bill of the team (team wage 
bill divided by average wage bill of all 
teams in respective season)
Variable testing 
hypothesis 2 0.230 4.147 1.000 0.533
Bosman
effect
Dummy variable equal to one for period 
where the Bosman effect starts; zero 
otherwise (from 1995/96 onwards=1 and 
zero elsewhere)
Variable testing 
hypothesis 3
0 1 0.362 0.481
CWP Win percentage of head coach Variable testing 
hypothesis 4
0 0.850 0.448 0.194
RP Relative points won (points accumulated 
by team divided by average number of 
points won by average team in respective 
season)
Variable testing 
hypothesis 4
0.206 0.779 0.484 0.121
CEXP Experience of head coach in the 
Bundesliga measured in years
Variable testing 
hypothesis 5
0 27 4.369 4.815
Table 2 presents the correlation among the variables 
Table 2: Correlation between variables
RSAL RWB BOSMAN CWP RP CEXP
RSAL 1.0000
RWB 0.6208 1.0000
BOSMAN -0.0000 -0.0000 1.0000
CWP 0.3789 0.2819 0.0136 1.0000
RP 0.4929 0.5979 -0.1798 0.3225 1.0000
CEXP 0.4737 0.1672 0.0085 0.4413 0.2773 1.0000
Table 3 presents the results of our estimations. We present a number of different 
duration models for comparative purposes. The dependent variable is always tenure 
with the current team, measured in years. The estimated coefficients are always in the 
proportional-hazard metric.
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Model 1 (M1) is the Cox proportional hazard model considering only the first 
occurrence of an event. Model 2 is the conditional risk-set model in gap time of 
Prentice, Williams and Peterson (1981). Model 3 is the parametric exponential model 
with the baseline hazard stratified by event. Finally, Model 4 is the Weibull model 
where the baseline hazard parameter, k , k=2,…6, is estimated separately at each 
occurrence of an event.
Table 3: Estimation Results 
M1 M2 M3 M4
Coef. s.e. Coef s.e.(2) Coef s.e.(2) Coef s.e.(2)
RSAL 0.106 0.293 0.011 0.237 0.009 0.144 -0.334 0.244
RWB 0.815 0.218 0.683 0.183 0.448 0.154 0.623 0.215
Bosman -0.656 0.217 -0.772 0.156 -0.559 0.109 -0.907 0.193
CWP 0.327 0.531 0.436 0.480 0.310 0.320 -1.001 0.503
RP -8.493 0.993 -8.415 0.726 -5.801 0.534 -5.725 0.679
CEXP 0.001 0.038 0.030 0.018 0.017 0.016 -0.039 0.026
2 0.023 0.122
3 0.118 0.139
4 0.075 0.195
5 -0.035 0.409
6 0.723 0.162
Constant 1.356 0.176 1.519 0.238
Ln( 2 ) 0.160 0.086
Ln( 3 ) 0.269 0.126
Ln( 4 ) 0.373 0.082
Ln( 5 ) 0.497 0.152
Ln( 6 ) 0.813 0.075
Ln(Const) 0.587 0.089
LL -369.3 -544.4 -205.3 -159.3
(1) – All models were estimated in Stata 9
(2) – Robust standard errors
k - baseline parameter for event, k=2,…,6, 
k - parameter of the Weibull base line hazard for event k=2,…,6
LL - Log Likelihood
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There are 114 coaches in the sample wh0 are responsible for 179 events and 10 
censored observations (models M2 - M4). The frequency of events is shown in Table 3.
Table 4: Frequencies
No. of Events 1 2 3 4 5 6
Frequencies 114 48 20 4 2 1
In all four models the results are quite similar in the main effects. The relative wage bill 
(RWB) has a positive effect in the hazard implying that coaches of more expensive 
teams tend to be fired earlier, i.e. expectations of management and fans are apparently 
higher than in teams that spend less money for their players. The sporting performance 
of the team (RP) and the regime shift (Bosman effect, change in labour market 
regulation of the players) have a negative impact on the hazard rate. This means that 
coaches playing working under the “Bosman effect” tend to survive longer.
Finally, in model 4 the coaches’ career win percentage is negative and statistically 
significant. This implies that better (in the sense of more successful) coaches tend to 
survive longer, too. Moreover, the time dependent parameter of the baseline hazard, k ,
is greater than one for all the occurrences of an event and its value increases with event 
number, implying that the risk of being fired increases with repeated events. This 
conclusion, however, should be taken with care because there are only a few 
observations for recurrent events greater than 3 (recall from Table 3 that only 7 out of 
114 coaches experience more than 3 events). Thus, further research using a much larger 
dataset is required.
7. Discussion
In our paper we analyze the determinants of head coach dismissals in the top tier of the 
German football league using a number of different survival models. We first have to 
reject H1 because the coefficient of RSAL has the expected sign, but is not statistically 
significant. We find support for our H2 because the respective coefficient is statistically 
significant, i.e. the coaches of more expensive teams (those with higher values of RWB) 
are more likely to be fired. Moreover, we find that coaches working under the “the 
Bosman effect” tend to survive longer, leading us to accept H3. We also find support for 
H4 which suggests that coaches producing more wins (i.e. whose teams have a better 
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sporting performance) tend to survive longer. Finally, H5 has to be rejected again, 
because prior coaching experience has no influence on the probability of surviving in a 
particular job.
What are the implications of these results? They are, of course, intuitive: Success on the 
pitch is the major determinant of survival. Head coaches who are able to produce more 
wins are likely to survive longer. Working with an expensive team makes the coach 
more vulnerable: Since the team’s team wage bill and the management’s as well as the 
fans expectations are highly correlated, a poor performance very often leads to an 
immediate dismissal (sometimes after a few weeks of the season already). Surprisingly, 
however, clubs seem not to blame coaches for a poor performance as quickly as they did 
in the past. In more recent years, coaches tend to survive longer. This outcome may be 
due to a number of reasons: First, coaching talent may be an even more scarce resource 
than it used to be (the teams in Germany rarely hire foreign coaches, i.e. the 
globalization of football has not contributed to an increased inflow of talent as opposed 
to the market for players). Second, since the salaries of head coaches went up 
considerably over the last years, it may simply be too expensive to dismiss a head coach 
with a valid contract. Third, replacing a head coach in the middle of the season may be a 
difficult task: If the teams at the beginning of the season hire the most able coaches it is 
clear that those still looking for a job in the middle of the season are, on average, of 
lower quality. This, in turn, may very often be a reason to keep the incumbent job - the 
available alternatives are even worse.
What are the policy implications of our findings? The most important result here is that 
organizational changes (Bosman Effect) have an impact on the survival of head coaches 
in the German Bundesliga. Thus, organizational changes should be taken into account 
when studying head coach departures over time. Head coaches themselves should take 
into account that although their salary reflects talent, it has no statistical influence on the 
probability of surviving in the present position. What as an impact, however, is the 
money spent on player salaries (head coach salaries and team wage bills are only 
moderately correlated with r=+0.45). 
How does our research compare with previous papers that have been published on this 
topic? Comparing the present results with Audas, Dobson and Goddard (1999) who 
analysed voluntary and involuntary job termination for English football coaches from 
1972-19997 and Audas, Goddard and Rowe (2006) who analysed coach departure in the 
USA National Hockey League from 1967-2002, the sole papers  directly comparable 
with the present one. Common results with Audas, Dobson and Goddard are that the 
hazard is sensitive to coach age, match results and winning ratio in both papers. 
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Therefore we validate previous research in this field. The results of Audas, Goddard and 
Rowe (2006) are not directly comparable with the present paper. Therefore, while 
validating previous research we also point out that the salary of the coach and the wage 
bill of the team are also predictors of coach departure.
8. Summary and Conclusions
In our paper we analyze the survival of head coaches in the first division in German 
professional soccer over the period 1981/82-2002/03. Using a unique and hitherto 
unavailable data set with information on team wage bills and head coach salaries we 
compare the results of different estimations. We estimate, first, a Cox proportional 
hazard model, second, a conditional risk-set in gap time, third a parametric exponential 
model and, fourth, a Weibull model. We find that while the salary of the head coach is 
statistically insignificant in explaining survival, the opposite holds for the team wage 
bill. Head coach experience as well as the career win percentage are statistically 
insignificant. Finally, organizational changes matter in the sense that the adoption of the 
Bosman effect” had a positive influence on the survival probabilities of head coaches.
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